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Political liberalisation in Africa has often been accompanied by a
somewhat paradoxical Obsession with autochthony, leading to more
or less violent forms of exclusion of migrants. South West Province,
one of the two provinces in the Anglophone region of Cameroon,
provides an interesting case study to illustrate this striking phenome-
non. In an area where a plantation economy was established during
German colonial rule, massive labour migration has been encouraged
from elsewhere in the country, particularly from the other Anglophone
province, North West Province. Following large-scale settlement of
northwestern migrants in the South West, the 'autochthonous' popu-
lation began to resent their increasing domination in demographic,
economie and political terms. When the government and its regional
allies feit threatened by widespread Opposition and federalist/-
secessionist tendencies in the Anglophone region during the political
liberalisation process in the 1990s, they starled exploiting existing
tensions between the 'autochthonous' and 'allochthonous' popula-
tions to boost South-West identity, promote various forms of ethnic
cleansing, and thus split the Anglophone front.
Introduction
It is striking and somewhat paradoxical that the current processes of globalisation and
liberalisation often appear to restrict rather than to promote a free flow of people and
labour. Throughout the world, various forms of exclusion of migrants can be observed,
even of second and third-generation immigrants. Western countries are witnessing not
only widespread attempts to control and regulate the increased flow of migrants, par-
ticularly from less-developed countries but also the development of serious tensions
between 'autochthons' and 'allochthons', the former fearing loss of identity and prefer-
ential access to scarce resources such as employment, the growth of right-wing move-
ments and parties and, in extreme situations, such as Bosnia, attempts at ethnic
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cleansing (cf. Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000). In many parts of Africa, too, mobility
appears to have become more and more problematic during economie and politica!
liberalisation, as is manifest in the intensification of conflicts between people who claim
to be indigenous to a certain territory and settlers or strangers, even long-standing
migrants of the same nationality.
Economie and political liberalisation in Africa has created space for autochthons to
articulate their long entrenched feelings about allochthonous domination in demo-
graphic, economie and political terms. Their struggles for control over economie and
political resources are mostly instigated or fuelled by political entrepreneurs. With the
introduction of multipartyism, the ruling party and govemment often fear being outvoted
during local and regional elections by 'strangers' who tend to support the Opposition for
the representation and defence of their interests. They are inclined to encourage a
distinction between 'ethnic citizens' and 'ethnic strangers' rather than to emphasise
national Integration and national citizenship (Mamdani 1996). Such a strategy naturally
serves the purpose of winning votes and consolidating power at national and regional
levels.
Some of the struggles between autochthons and allochthons have occurred at the
local level, notably over control of land (cf. Simo 1997; Mvondo 1998). Others have
occurred at the national level between nationals and immigrants of African, Asian and
European origin especially regarding control over employment and business. In Gabon,
for instance, there have been violent actions by nationals against immigrants from
neighbouring African countries, Lebanon and France (Gray 1998). Economie and
political liberalisation in Tanzania has been accompanied by a rise in social tensions
between Tanzanians and the prosperous Asian business Community and calls for the
indigenisation of the latter's property (Keilman 1998). Most clashes, however, appear to
have taken place at the regional level, particularly where autochthonous ethnic groups
feel dominated by allochthonous ethnic groups. One serious conflict between autoch-
thonous and allochthonous ethnic groups took place in Rift Valley Province in Kenya
between the Kalenjin and Maasai on the one hand, and the Kikuyu and Luo on the other
(Médard 1996; Keilman 1998; Ogachi 1999). Another outbreak of violence occurred in
1993-1996 between the autochthonous ethnic minority groups and the allochthonous
Banyarwarda (migrants from Rwanda) in Northern Kivou in the Democratie Republic of
Congo (Mathieu & Tsongo 1998; Pourtier 1996).
Several conflicts between autochthons and allochthons have emerged during political
liberalisation in Cameroon, albeit in most cases of a less violent nature than in Kenya
and the Democratie Republic of Congo (cf. Socpa 1999; Tabapssi 1999). In this chapter
the focus is on the deteriorating relations between autochthons and allochthons in the
coastal forest area of Anglophone Cameroon, present-day South West Province (see
Map 11.1). This province provides an interesting case study as it is one of the few
regions along the West African coast where a plantation economy was established
during the German colonial period (1884-1916) (Epale 1985; Konings 1993). The
plantation economy stimulated large-scale labour migration to the coastal estates and,
more importantly, increased the settlement of plantation labour in the area after retire-
ment. This chapter considers why the current Obsession with the autochthony-
allochthony issue in South West Province relates foremost to relations between the
inhabitants of the two provinces of Anglophone Cameroon: autochthonous South
Westerners versus allochthonous North Westerners. This is all the more surprising since
political liberalisation has created space for the emergence and rapid growth of several
Anglophone associations, stressing their Anglophone identity and solidarity. These
movements have attempted to mobilise the Anglophone population as a whole against
the Francophone-dominated unitary state, which is accused of 'marginalising, exploiting
and assimilating' the Anglophone minority (All Anglophone Conference 1993), and
demand a return to the federal state or outright secession (Konings 1996a; Konings &
Nyamnjoh 1997). The South-West elite's fear of renewed North-West domination
during political liberalisation was one of the main reasons for their incitement of the
autochthonous minority against the dominant and exploitative northwestem settlers and
their request for govemment protection.
The South-West plantation economy and labour mobility
The continuous support given by the German colonial state (1884-1916) to plantation
production led to the large-scale expropriation of approximately 300,000 acres of very
fertile volcanic soil around Mount Cameroon in the South West Province and the
expulsion of the original occupants of the expropriated lands, in particular the Bakweri,
to prescribed native reserves (Courade 1981/82; Molua 1985). Nearly all the estates in
the area were held by German planters.
During the First World War, the British occupied the area and confiscated the
German planters' estates. By 1922, however, the British Mandate Authority had already
decided to get rid of them, as the administrative costs of maintaining them were
prohibitive. It seriously considered returning the plantation lands to their original
owners but finally dropped the idea. Instead, it was decided that it would be in the best
interests of the territory and its inhabitants to place the plantations back in the hands of
foreign private enterprise. They were put up for auction in 1922 and 1924. For a variety
of reasons, the vast majority of the estates were bought back by the former German
owners (Konings 1993). One notable exception was the estates acquired by the United
Africa Company (UAC), a well-known Unilever subsidiary (Fieldhouse 1978 and 1994).
After its foundation in 1929, the UAC took over three local estates from the African and
Eastem Trading Company (AETC) and, in 1932, bought another estate from the West-
afrikanische Handelsgesellschaft at Lobe. lts most important estates are located in
today's Ndian Division of South West Province, bordering eastern Nigeria. lts estates
came to be known as Pamol Ltd, the principal private agro-industrial enterprise in the
country (Konings 1998).
At the beginning of the Second World War, the German estates were expropriated
again by the Custodian of Enemy Property. After the war, a decision had to be reached
once more on how to dispose of the properties. The educated Bakweri elite, organised in
the so-called Bakweri Land Committee, immediately starled to agitate for the retrieval
of its ancestral lands. It sent several petitions, first to the British Crown and subse-
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quently to the United Nations, as Britain had assumed respons.b.hty for the admmistra-
Son of the territory under United Nations' Trusteeship after the war (Molua 1985).
However after considerable dehberation, the British Trusteeship Authonty decbned to
surrender the ex-German plantation lands to their original owners and announced m
NoTmber 1946 that the is would be leased to a newly estab.ished statutory corpora-
tion, the Cameroon Development Corporat.on (CDC) (Ardener et al. I960; Epale 1985,
t g n c u l t u r e i. labour-mtenswe and by 1914, German planters needed about
18,000 workers. Pamol's labour force gradually rose frorn 1,200 to 3,500. The CDC the
econd largest employer in the country (being only surpassed by the government)
nitially employed between 20,000 and 25,000 labourers. Today rt employs approxi-
maely 14,000 labourers (Komngs 1993 and 1998). The procurement of a regulär and
Iquate upply of labour was for a long time a major problem for plantaüon produc-
tion The German planters experienced almost insurmountable problerns procunng
iLent labour from the local commumties which were not only sparse y populated
but also hated working for the expropriators of their land. Ttas compelled hem to
import a considerable number of labourers from outside Cameroon, m part.cular from
ITous West African countries (Rudin 1938; Rüger I960). Th, nnported labour
however could not solve the acute labour problem. It also turned out to be expenswe
vTch was a major reason for its quick abandonment. The gradual openmg up and
;Scrn of tb! more densely populated areas of the mtenor revealed the.r enormous
Potential for solving the labour problem. The large majonty of people m the mtenor
however, were not'ready to accept voluntary ,abour ««« » vj™» J™ *
coercion were employed during the entire German penod to free labour from the
In"* the plarLLs. ImtiaHy, ,arge „umbers of men from ^fous areas were
simply seized and sent to the plantations for up to six years as a kmd of penal labour
"fsometimes rece.vmg no pay at all. Later on, a .abour recruitmer ^ system was
deve oped based on the continuous coercive pressures of pnvate recruiters, local
o f i ïanSuitaWy bribed African chiefs (Halldén 1968; Chilver 1971 Clarence-
SmTtn 1989) Near the end of German colonial rule, limited head taxes and hut taxes
w^fimposed which encouraged Africans to work on the plantations. Persons ;un,ble to
pay taxes in cash would be turned over to private employers who paid the tax and the
t m l a n d recruitment areas were the Yaoundé regron and the Gr^
fields area both in the Francophone part ofCameroon and occupied by the Barmleke
and present-day North West Provmce, part of the later Anglophone «pon and ^ occupied
by vanous ettaic groups closely related to the Bamileke.lt was dunng the BnUsh
Mandate period that a gradual transition occurred from forced to voluntary labou
migration This was facilitated by a variety of factors includmg the ƒ ^ ^ "'utiva
cash improved conditions of service (especially the prov.smn of land for food culUva-
tion, the so-called 'chop farms') and active recruitment through etoc, commun.ty and
weinit.al.y remarkable differences between the CDC and Pamol conceming
labour recruitment areas (Konings 1993 and 1998). When the CDC was estabhshed m
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1946/47, it was faced with a serious decline in the supply of labour from Francophone
Cameroon. Labour mobility from this area used to be encouraged by forms of forced
labour imposed by the French (Kaptue 1986). By 1926 approximately 52% of the
plantation labour force originated from the French Mandate area (Table 11.1). This
figure gradually declined to only 1% in the 1980s. The efforts of the French Mandate
Authority to stabilise labour within its home regions and to prevent it from leaving the
French Mandate area greatly contributed to this decline. The expansion of more
remunerative employment opportunities in Francophone Cameroon and the rising cost
of living in Anglophone Cameroon in the aftermath of independence and reunifïcation
in 1961 brought about a further reduction in labour migration from Francophone to
Anglophone Cameroon (Ndongko 1975). Apart from a temporary influx of labour from
neighbouring eastem Nigeria (Ardener et al. 1960) and a steady labour force from South
West Province, this decline was largely compensated for by an increasing number of
labour migrants from North West Province. This province had a higher population
density, was much later in developing cash-crop production, and lacked job opportuni-
ties outside the traditional sector.
Table 11.1: Regional composition of the CDC and Pamol labour farces (%)
1926 1941 1950 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
CDC
North West Province
South West Province
Francophone Cameroon
Eastem Nigeria
Total
Pamol
North West Province
South West Province
Francophone Cameroon
Eastern Nigeria
Total
14.0
33.0
52.0
1.0
100
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
37.0
27.5
25.0
10.5
100
n.a.
n. a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
32.5
33.0
13.0
21.5
100
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
43.5
25.0
4.5
27.0
100
5.0
13.0
1.7
80.3
100
54.5
38.0
5.0
2.5
100
27.0
47.0
1.7
24.3
100
73.5
24.5
1.0
1.0
100
41.8
44.4
1.3
12.5
100
71.0
27.0
1.0
1.0
100
54.0
33.5
1.0
11.5
100
Source: Komngs 1993 and 1998
Pamol faced even more problems than the CDC in recruiting sufficient labour. lts main
estates are located in one of the most marginalised areas of Cameroon where the cost of
living is extremely high due to regulär food shortages. Cameroonian workers were, con-
sequently, inclined to seek employment on the CDC estates. Li these circumstances,
neighbouring eastern Nigeria readily became the main supplier of labour to the Pamol
estates. In 1961, eastern Nigerians accounted for 80% of the total Pamol labour force
(Table 11.1). Since independence and reunifïcation, the dominant position of Nigerian
workers on the Pamol estates has rapidly declined. However, managerial failure to
recruit sufficient labour in Anglophone Cameroon formed an insurmountable obstacle to
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the complete realisation of the government's Cameroonisation policy: in 1970 Nigerian
workers still accounted for a quarter of the total Pamol labour force. From the 1970s
onwards, a certain stabilisation in labour recruitment from Nigeria can be seen at around
12%. Under constant pressure to 'cameroonise', the management staged a renewed
recruiting drive in Anglophone Cameroon, first in the nearby Ndian and Manyu
Divisions of South West Province and later in various divisions of North West Province.
As at the CDC, northwestern workers at present account for the majority of the labour
force on the Pamol estates (54%).
Labour mobility and relations between autochthons and allochthons
on the southwestem estates prior to political liberalisation
It is striking that there have been few serious clashes between autochthonous and
stranger ethnic groups on the southwestem estates. Tensions between autochthons and
allochthons are most likely to arise when stranger ethno-regional groups appear to
occupy a dominant position on the estates.
The dominant position of eastern Nigerian workers on the CDC and particularly on
the Pamol estates in the nationalist climate after the Second World War gave rise to
serious frictions between autochthonous Anglophone Cameroonian workers and eastern
Nigerian strangers. During the 1947-1960 period, Anglophone Cameroonian workers on
the CDC and Pamol estates undertook a series of collective and informal actions aimed
at the removal of Igbo and Ibibio supervisory staff and management (Konings 1993: 69
and 1998: 80), repeatedly calling upon management and govemment to promote a rapid
Cameroonisation of the labour force and management staff. Since independence and
reunifïcation, former animosities between Anglophone Cameroonian and Nigerian
workers appear to have largely subsided, probably because Nigerians have become a
relatively small, stranger minority group on the estates, and are thus no longer perceived
by Anglophone Cameroonians as a threat. During fieldwork, some Nigerian workers
expressed the view that their best strategy was to assume a low profile so as not to
encourage envy and arouse tensions (cf. Kleis 1975). Although conflicts have not
disappeared altogether, the social distance between Nigerian and Cameroonian workers
appears to have diminished (DeLancey 1973).
After the conflict between Anglophone Cameroonian and Nigerian workers, a new
potential source of friction could be in relations between the autochthonous southwest-
em minority and the northwestern majority on the estates. Extended clashes between
these two groups have not yet occurred. On the contrary, all researchere on estate labour
agree that southwestem and northwestern workers usually live and work together peace-
fully (Ardener et al. 1960; DeLancey 1973; Kofele-Kale 1981; Konings 1993 and 1998).
Both groups tend to organise not only on an ethnic but also on an inter-ethnic basis, as is
seen in the membership of churches and trade unions. They have engaged from time to
time in common struggles against managerial control and exploitation in the workplace.
One reason for this unexpected phenomenon is the consistent policy of the management,
as well as church and union leaders, to mobilise and organise workers on a multi-ethnic
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basis. This policy seems to have created a certain measure of understanding and
tolerance among the workers for each other's socio-cultural backgrounds, thus fostering
bonds of companionship and friendship across ethno-regional boundaries. Another
reason is the general use of Pidgin English, which has helped overcome communication
barriers between the various ethnic groups. A third reason is the marked preference of
workers themselves for ethnically-mixed living and working arrangements, partly
stemming from their belief that witchcraft is most likely to occur among close relatives
and tribesmen (Ardener et al. 1960; Konings 1993). The most important reason, how-
ever, appears to be the shared living and working conditions on the estates, which are
classical examples of occupational communities. However, while relations between
southwestem and northwestern workers appear to be more or less peaceful, relations
between southwestem and northwestern managers have been marked by fierce conflicts
caused by the persistent attempts of the southwestem managerial minority to establish
control over agro-industrial enterprises located in 'their' region (see below).1
The effects of labour mobility on the relations between autochthons and allochthons
in local communities in the South West appear to have been more dramatic. While
initially most migrant workers returned to their region of origin after short spells of
work on the estates, an increasing number gradually decided to settle in the South West
after retirement. The CDC and Pamol management also proved incapable of accommo-
dating all their workers in the labour camps on the estates and some workers were
obliged to find accommodation in the villages and towns surrounding the estates.
Settlers were soon joined by fellow members of their ethnic group who wanted to grow
food or cash crops on the fertile lands or to become artisans, traders or employees in
local enterprises. In some coastal districts, like Victoria District, the local population
"almost became overwhelmed by these strangers even before the Second World War"
(Gwan 1975). Indeed, strangers rapidly found themselves in the majority in local towns
and villages.
Initially, strangers were welcomed by the local population and given land in usufruct,
thus becoming more or less incorporated in the land-giving lineage. They were usually
expected to provide a small recompense in kind as a token of appreciation for the land-
giver. According to Ardener et al. (1960), the procedure for a stranger to have access to
land in the Bakweri area was to provide a pig for the villagers. He was then accorded a
usufruct without further payments of rents. Yet, it soon became evident that the local
tenure System could not cope with the increasing flow of strangers and that local institu-
tions were too weak to enforce the existing norms and rules. The System collapsed. A
' Unlike on the CDC and Pamol estates in Anglophone Cameroon, some severe clashes between
autochthonous and stranger workers have reportedly occurred on agro-industrial enterprises situated in the
southem part of Francophone Cameroon, especially on the SOSUCAM sugar estates at Mbandjock
(Barbier et al. 1980; Ngend 1982). Two factors seem to be responsible for the violent confrontation
between southern and northem workers on the latter enterprise in 1976. First of all, the existence of
occupational and ethno-regional overlapping has always constituted a potentially explosive Situation at
SOSUCAM: the higher-paid jobs are occupied by the better-educated and skilled workers from the south
and the less well-paid jobs by the uneducated and unskilled workers from the north. And secondly, the
unskilled northern sugar-cane cutters tend to oppose any integrative efforts and prefer to live separately.
These factors continue to create problems for the achievement of a peaceful coexistence between both
ethno-regional groups, and do not encourage workers' solidarity.
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land market quickly developed in those areas with important stranger concentrations
(Meek 1957; Fisiy 1992). The resulting unprincipled access to land degenerated into
numerous land disputes, especially in Victoria District where land shortages rapidly
developed. Disputes arose because different villages sought to seil the same piece of
land to strangers. Even strangers who had lived in an area for a long time could rent land
to other strangers. A handful of local residents were gaining handsomely from this
breakdown of customary tenure as they offered communal land to strangers for money.
Local chiefs and elders regularly protested to the British administration about the
unscrupulous land-grabbing by strangers in their areas of jurisdiction but they did not
usually obtain the expected support. The British authorities acknowledged the existing
land problems but they did not bring about any structural change, not wanting to disturb
the economie role of immigrants whose entrepreneurial spirit and hard work were said
to compare favourably with the consumerist attitudes and laziness of the local popula-
tion. In addition, the term 'native' was not clearly defined in the Native Lands and
Rights Ordinance. In Section 2 a 'native' was defined as a person, one of whose parents
was a member of any ethnic group indigenous to the British Mandate territory. The
Provision in Section 3 that "it shall not be lawful for any native holding a right of
occupancy to seil, transfer possession, bequeath or otherwise alienate his title to a non-
native except with the consent of the governor" therefore did not apply to any inhabitant
of Anglophone Cameroon living in South West Province.
Land was not the only reason for the development of antagonistic relations between
autochthons and strangers in local communities. The local population envied the
settlers' success in agriculture, trade and other entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, they
resented their frequent disrespect for local authority and customs, their regulär seduction
of local women and their alleged disinclination to invest in local development, prefer-
ring instead to transfer any accumulated capita! to their region of origin (Ardener et al.
1960; Ardener 1962). It was generally believed that settlers were only interested in
exploiting and dominating the local population, while continuing to be loyal to their
own ethnic group, which was ultimately evidenced by their frequent desire either to
return home at the end of their working life or to be buried in the land of their ancestors.
The simmering conflict between natives and strangers has sometimes exploded in the
past, leading to various forms of ethnic cleansing. Strikingly, any violent conflict of this
nature used to occur between autochthons and settlers originating from outside Anglo-
phone Cameroon. As on the estates, the local population, often instigated by regional
politicians (Kleis 1975; Amazee 1990), directed its anger after the Second World War at
the eastern Nigerian settlers who had come to dominate the regional administration and
trade. Particularly the Igbo became victims of verbal and physical attacks by frustrated
local inhabitants and were often told to return home. Early in February 1948 the
Bakweri Native Authority passed the following rules to control relations between
natives and Igbo:
• Nobody is allowed to seil his or her house to an Igbo, neither may anybody give his
or her house for rentage to an Igbo.
• No farmland may be sold to an Igbo or rented to an Igbo.
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• Nobody may allow an Igbo to enter any native farm or forest for purpose of finding
sticks for building or for any other purposes.
• Houses or farms already sold to an Igbo man shall be purchased by the Native
Authonty who will afterwards resell same to some suitable person.
• Nobody shall trade with Igbos for any thing of value or not.
• All landlords must ask their Igbo tenants to quit bcfore 15 March 1948.
• No Cameroon woman is allowed to communicate with the Igbos in any form.2
An even more serieus incident occurred in 1966 when a long-standing conflict between
the local Bakossi and Bamileke immigrants in the Tombel area ended in a bloody
confrontation. The Bamileke, inhabitants of the Francophone part of the Grassfields, are
renowned in Cameroon for their mobility and entrepreneurial ethos (Warnier 1993;
Tabapssi 1999). They had acquired a great deal of land in the Tombel area, often after
having been employed as labourers on the CDC estates in the area and on the cocoa
farms of the local peasantry (Levin 1980). After the 1950s, tensions developed between
the local population and the Bamileke immigrants. The Bakossi had become jealous of
seeing the Bamileke prosper on the land they had acquired in the area at low cost and
land disputes erupted. Tensions increased further after the outbreak of the Union des
Populations du Cameroun (UPC) rebellion in Francophone Cameroon in 1955 (Joseph
1977). The UPC received strong support in the Bamileke area and many Bamileke
youths became UPC guerrilla fighters. UPC guerrilla warfare soon affected the Tombel
area close to the border between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. UPC
guerrillas starled looting local farms and enterprises and kidnapping or killing any
person unfortunate enough to cross their path. The Bakossi accused Bamileke farmers in
the area of supporting and protecting their UPC brothers. In 1966, they began to hold
meetings, in which Bakossi secret societies and medicine men played a significant role,
in order to préparé themselves for an attack on the Bamileke settlers. When they heard
on 31 December 1966 that UPC terrorists had killed five Bakossi, they immediately
mobilised to take revenge. They, and particularly the Bakossi self-defence units that had
been armed by the govemment to combat guerrilla attacks, went into action, killing no
less than 236 Bamileke and setting fire to 181 Bamileke houses (Ngalame 1997;
Ejedepang-Koge 1986).
No such incident has occurred since. The simmering conflict between autochthons
and allochthons in the southwestem communities, however, continues to provide for
explosive material that can easily be manipulated and used by political entrepreneurs.
The growing divide between the South-West
and North-West elites in Anglophone Cameroon
In addition to the large-scale migration and settlement of North Westerners in South
West Province, the growing divide between the South-West and North-West elites has
contributed to the southwestem attack on northwestern strangers during current
2
 Letter from Bakweri Native Authonty, Buea, to Senior Divisional Officer, Victoria, dated 11 February
1948, in BNA, File PC/h (1948) l, Conditions of Settlement.
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economie and political liberalisation. This divide within the Anglophone elite must be
attributed to the South-West elite's perception of increasing political domination of the
North-West elite at the regional and national level since the end of the 1950s.
During the nationalist struggle after the Second World War, the Anglophone elite
initially demonstrated a large degree of unity. They strongly resented the administration
of the Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons as a mere appendage of Nigeria and
eastern Nigerian domination of the Southern Cameroonian economy. They first
demanded a larger representation in the Nigerian administration and later regional
autonomy. Interestingly, in the late 1940s the question of reunification of Anglophone
and Francophone Cameroon cropped up in the programmes of the various Southern
Cameroonian political movements and parties, raising the possibility of an alternative
political Option for the Southern Cameroons to escape from its subordinate position in
the British-Nigerian colonial systern and Igbo domination (Johnson 1970; Konings
1999aandl999b).
From the mid-1950s onwards, nationalist leaders in the Southern Cameroons became
increasingly divided. Different points of view on the political trajectory of the area
tended to be reinforced by personality differences between the major political leaders,
Dr Emmanuel Endeley and John Ngu Foncha,3 and ethno-regional differences within the
trust territory.
Endeley, a medical doctor by training, was from the South West, being a son of the
Bakweri Paramount Chief at Buea (Geschiere 1993; Konings 1999b). He was the leader
of the then-ruling South West-based Kamerun National Convention (KNC) party.
Following constitutional changes leading to a growing autonomy of the Southern
Cameroons in the Nigerian Federation, Endeley became Leader of Government Business
in 1954 and the first Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons in 1958. He moved
from an anti-Nigeria and pro-reunification stand towards a more positive view of
Nigeria when the Southern Cameroons became a quasi-region within Nigeria in 1954.
His new position was even strengthened when the Southern Cameroons achieved füll
regional status in 1958. From his perspective, regional status seemed an adequate
answer to the problems of Nigerian domination, the lack of Southern Cameroonian
participation in the Nigerian political system, and economie Stagnation. With regional
status, Southern Cameroonians could rule themselves, maintain their ties with the
British colonial legacy, and avoid the violence and chaos of the civil war going on in
Francophone Cameroon after 1955 when the UPC was banned by the French authorities.
Endeley's increasing championship of Southern Cameroonian Integration into Nigeria
received the tacit approval of the British authorities.
Endeley's opponent, John Ngu Foncha, was a teacher by profession and hailed from
the Anglophone part of the Grassfields, present-day North West Province. Foncha had
been a leading figure in Endeley's KNC until 1955, when he broke away to form his
own party, the North West-based Kamerun National Democratie Party (KNDP). Foncha
and his supporters blamed Endeley for no longer adhering to the original KNC pro-
gramme of evolutionary reunification of the two Cameroons and for his new pro-
3
 For a more detailed description of the lives and views of these outstanding early leaders in the Southern
Cameroonian nationalist struggle, see Konings 1999b.
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Nigerian stance. While Foncha's political views on the future of the Southern Came-
roons were not always consistent, hè seems to have mostly crusaded for secession from
Nigeria and (eventual) reunification with Francophone Cameroon. Political dissension,
however, was not the only reason for Foncha's break with Endeley's party. He also
thought that a North West-based party was more likely to represent and defend north-
western interests than a South West-based party. Ethnically different from the coastal
forest peoples, the Grassfields had been socio-economically disadvantaged during the
colonial period through the more extensive development of education, infrastructure,
and agro-industrial and other enterprises in South West Province. Furthermore, South-
West leaders had a louder voice in political affairs than those from the North West.
With the approaching independence of Nigeria and Francophone Cameroon in I960,
the 1959 elections became a relentless struggle for hegemony between the dominant
parties and leaders in the Southern Cameroons. It was generally understood that the
victor in these elections would be given a mandate to negotiate the political future of the
territory. During the election campaign the KNDP used various strategies to defeat the
KNC. First, it attempted to capitalise on the widespread 'Igbo scare' in the Southern
Cameroons, an issue that the KNC apparently underestimated. KNDP leaders alleged
that a vote for the KNC would mean the Integration of the Southern Cameroons into
Nigeria and the continuation of Igbo domination. Second, the KNDP attempted to
present itself as a regional party, especially when campaigning in the more densely
populated and less-developed North West (Ebune 1992).
By employing such strategies, the KNDP was able to win the 1959 elections. On the
one hand, its victory was a political event with important consequences for South West-
North West relations. While the South-West elite had dominated the political scène in
the Southern Cameroons until the 1959 elections, the KNDP's victory signified the start
of North-West hegemony in the territory, with Foncha becoming Prime Minister of the
Southern Cameroons. Henceforth the North-West elite began to play a dominant politi-
cal and economie role in the region. In pre-empting for themselves the choicest jobs and
lands in South West Province, they provoked strong resentment among South Western-
ers (Kofele-Kale 1981; Ngwane 1994). South-West sentiments have been intensified by
the gradual success of entrepreneurial North Westemers in dominating most sectors of
South West Province's economy, in particular trade, transport and housing (Rowlands
1993). On the other hand, the KNDP's victory was so narrow, winning 14 out of the 26
seats, that it did not provide Foncha with a clear mandate to start negotiating the politi-
cal future of the Southern Cameroons at the United Nations. It was therefore agreed that
Endeley should not be left out of these negotiations.
Since Foncha and Endeley proved incapable of resolving their differences on the
political future of the Southern Cameroons, the UN General Assembly eventually
decided to hold a plebiscite on the issue in the trust territory and more or less imposed
the question to be asked. Do you want to achieve independence by joining Nigeria or by
reuniting with the Republic of Cameroon (the new name of former French Cameroon
after independence on l January I960)?
The plebiscite was to be held on 11 February 1961. In the time preceding the
plebiscite the KNDP and the Cameroon Peoples' National Congress (CPNC) - an
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alliance between Endeley's KNC and another South West-based party, N.N. Mbile's
Kamerun Peoples' Party (KPP), with the obvious aim of forming a united front against
the KNDP - used similar themes and tactics to win votes as during the 1959 elections.
While the KNDP tried to win votes by capitalising on widespread anti-Nigerian feelings
and vague sentiments of Cameroonian brotherhood, the CPNC singled out terrorism in
the Republic of Cameroon to scare Southern Cameroonians from voting for reunifica-
tion. The CPNC also tried to impress upon the electorale that reunification would mean
a complete change of language, system of government and way of life (Welch 1966;
Johnson 1970). Both parties also regularly appealed to ethno-regional sentiments and
loyalties. The latter created a great deal of tension between the local population and the
Grassfields settlers in South West Province and some southwestern politicians even
threatening to expel Grassfielders by force (Chem-Langhëë 1976). CPNC leaders were
often barred from campaigning in North West Province. In the end, the KNDP emerged
victorious from the plebiscite: 233,571 Southern Cameroonians voted for reunification
with the Republic of Cameroon while only 97,741 voted for Integration into Nigeria.
The ratio of votes for and against reunification with Francophone Cameroon was
significantly higher in North West Province (3.5 to 1) than in South West Province (1.5
to 1) (Welch 1966). The results of the plebiscite reinforced the South West-North West
divide. The South West elite insisted that the KNDP's victory in South West Province
was due to the votes of northwestem workers and settlers there.
Following the plebiscite, a Bakweri cultural society, the Bakweri Molongo, claimed
that 'native strangers' had voted for reunification because they wanted to continue
dominating the Bakweri.
Native strangers voted for reunification m the Victoria Division in order to seize the
Bakweri lands, and m order to spite and over-run the Bakweri. We, the Bakwen, have
voted for Nigena because the Nigerian Constitution provides safeguards for the mmori-
ties which is what the Bakwen are (quoted m Chem-Langhëë 1976: 331).
The CPNC leaders strongly protested to the United Nations about the results that, to
them, were very unsatisfactory. They held that ethnic sentiments had played a crucial
role in influencing opinion during the plebiscite and called on the United Nations to
interpret the results on an ethnic basis. When an ethnic group voted in favour of union
with Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon, it should be allowed to join the country of its
choice. Their appeal was rejected, however, and the United Nations accepted the results
as they stood.
The South West-North West divide manifested itself again when the Anglophone
elite entered into negotiations with the Francophone elite about the creation of a federal
state. Foncha headed the multi-party delegation to the constitutional talks held at
Foumban from 17 to 21 July 1961 (Konings 1999a). The delegation included many
KNDP ministers who were obviously inclined to limit the role of Opposition politicians
in the deliberations (Ngoh 1990 and 1996). The Anglophone elite proposed a loose form
of federation with a large measure of autonomy for the two federated states, which, in
their view, would provide for the equal partnership of both parties and the preservation
of the cultural heritage and identity of each. The Francophone elite, on the contrary,
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proposed a highly centralised form of federation that they considered to be merely a
transitory phase to the total Integration of the Anglophone region into a strong, unitary
state. Capitalising on its strenger bargaining position since Francophone Cameroon was
much larger and more developed than Anglophone Cameroon and, more importantly, it
was already an independent state, the Francophone delegation was able to impose upon
the Anglophone delegation its own conception of the future federal state. The conse-
quences of these constitutional arrangements have been dramatic for the Anglophone
population. For the latter, nation-building in the post-colonial state has been driven by
the firm determinaüon of the Francophone political elite to dominate and exploit the
Anglophone minority and to erase the cultural and institutional foundation of Anglo-
phone identity (Mukong 1990; Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997; Eyoh 1998a).
At present, the South-West elite is inclined to indict the North-West elite as co-
architects with the Francophone elite of the post-colonial order marked by the blatant
recolonisation and marginalisation of the Anglophone territory by the Francophone-
dominated state. They point out that northwestem politicians were in control of the
Federated State of West Cameroon (the then-named Anglophone Cameroon) during the
1961-1972 period, when multi-partyism and federalism were abolished, accusing them
of self-interested betrayal of West Cameroonian autonomy and identity. Eyoh (1998a)
rightly observed that this South-West narrative was characterised by an impressive dose
of historical amnesia, willed acts of selective remembrance of the past so as to discount
the responsibility of the South-West elite in what was a collective elite project.
The South West-North West divide was actually one of the decisive factors prevent-
ing the Anglophone elite from forming a united front against President Ahidjo's
attempts to weaken the federal structure and undermine the autonomy and identity of
West Cameroon. The speed with which the entire Anglophone political elite embraced
the single-party concept is clear evidence of their lust for power and influence within the
changing power constellation in the federal state (Kofele-Kale 1987).
Contrary to current attempts by the South-West elite to make the North-West elite
fully responsible for the Anglophone predicament, Dr Endeley was the first to be con-
verted to Ahidjo's idea of a one-party state. As the leader of West Cameroon's minority
party, Endeley saw Ahidjo's plans not only as an opportunity for him to play a role in
national politics but also as a means of preventing his party from being dominated by
the majority KKDP. Moreover, hè was inclined to embrace the one-party state as a way
of escape for the South West from northwestem domination (Ngwane 1994). Rivalry
among the West Cameroonian leaders provided an excellent opportunity for Ahidjo to
dissolve West Cameroon's parties and to create a single party in 1966. The gradual co-
optation of the Anglophone political elite into the 'hegemonie alliance' (Bayart 1979)
and the autocratie nature of the Ahidjo regime largely explain why they did not resist the
abolition of the federation in 1972. To reduce any danger of united Anglophone action
against Francophone domination, Ahidjo decided to divide the erstwhile Federated State
of West Cameroon into two provinces. This decision, masterfully informed by the
intemal contradictions within the Anglophone territory between the coastal forest people
(South West Province) and the Grassfields people (North West Province), would
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exacerbate these divisions that in future would serve as the Achilles' heel of most
attempts at Anglophone identity and Organisation.
The South-West elite's resentment at the continuing North-West domination in their
region after the abolition of the federal state is reflected in their struggle for control over
the CDC and Pamol. This struggle has often paralysed the CDC's administration and
management (Konings 1996b and 1997). Since independence and reunification, the
chairman of the CDC Board of Directors has usually been a South Westerner. Prominent
South Westemers, like Chief Victor Mukete, Chief Sam Endeley, John Ebong Ngolle
and Nerius Nomaso Mbile have all occupied this position. The daily management of the
Corporation, however, has become increasingly dominated by North Westerners. The
appointment of a North Westerner, John Niba Ngu, as the first Cameroonian General
Manager of the Corporation in 1974 occurred on the advice of the CDC's external
financiers but was strongly resented by the southwestern managerial and political elite.
First, there were also some suitable southwestern candidates for the post, particularly
Isaac Malafa, who used to be senior to Ngu in the Corporation's hierarchy, having served
as the Deputy General Manager for a couple of years. Second, the southwestern manage-
rial elite feared that Ngu's appointment would reinforce northwestem domination over
CDC management. Ngu's fourteen years in office (1974-1988) were marked by strong
anti-North West feelings, hè himself being regularly accused by the southwestern
managerial elite of favouring his own countrymen. Ngu's severe conflicts with two of
the southwestern chairmen of the CDC, Chief Victor Mukete and Chief Sam Endeley,
have become almost legendary. Following considerable southwestern pressures,
Ahidjo's successor to the presidency, Paul Biya, replaced Ngu in 1988 with Peter
Mafany Musonge, a Bakweri. Ngu was then appointed Minister of Agriculture, a post
that, incidentally, had meanwhile become Supervisory Minister of the CDC. In this
capacity, Ngu continued to have influence in the CDC, thus denying his successor total
freedom to carry out his duties. The southwestern managerial elite alleged that Ngu was
using his brothers among the management staff to pester and remove Musonge.
Together with other sections of the southwestern elite, they requested Musonge reduce
North-West influence in the corporation.
An even more vehement conflict between the South-West and North-West elites
developed in 1987 when Unilever decided to withdraw from plantation activities in
Cameroon due to the government's refusal to support Pamol during the severe crisis
facing the agro-industrial sector in the 1980s (Konings 1997 and 1998). Unilever then
agreed to seil Pamol to a consortium of well-known northwestem businessmen with
whom it had come into contact during mediation with the predominantly northwestem
management staff. As soon as it became known that bom parties had signed a contract,
the South-West elite started agitating against the North-West takeover of Pamol,
appealing to the state to intervene on their behalf. In a strongly worded petition, they
declared categorically that they would never allow their ancestral lands, occupied by
Unilever for decades, to be colonised and exploited by North Westemers. They claimed
that a North-West takeover of Pamol would inevitably strengthen North-West domina-
tion over the South West. They therefore urgently appealed to the state to annul the
contract between Unilever and the northwestem consortium and to support an eventual
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South-West takeover of Pamol. The effective mobilisation of the regional elite was
clearly a decisive factor in the ultimate success of the South-West political offensive. In
the face of such a demonstration of unity and determination, the govemment did not
dare to disappoint the South West, an area of vital importance to the national economy
in terms of its oil, timber and agricultural resources (Ndzana 1987). When the govem-
ment finally announced its decision to annul the contract between Unilever and the
northwestern consortium, Unilever decided on 13 October 1987 to put the Company into
voluntary liquidation. Since then the South-West elite has made several attempts to buy
Pamol.
Political liberalisation and the aggravation of the
autochthony-allochthony issue in South West Province
Political liberalisation in the early 1990s fanned the rivalry between South-West and
North-West elites in their struggle for power at the regional and national level. Out of
fear of renewed North-West domination, the South-West elite, and especially the section
that was closely connected with the regime in power, tried to stimulate South-West
identity and Organisation, even to the extent of inciting the autochthonous population in
South West Province against the allegedly dominant and exploitative northwestern
strangers or settlers.
The South-West elite became alarmed when the liberalisation of political space
resulted in the rapid growth of both the North West-based Opposition party, the Social
Democratie Front (SDF), and several Anglophone movements which contested Franco-
phone domination and demanded first a return to the federal state and later outright
secession (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997; Takougang & Krieger 1998). The growing
popularity of these organisations immediately raised their suspicions of renewed North-
West domination over the South West.
From a South-West point of view, such suspicions were not without foundation. The
SDF was clearly a party organised and controlled by the North-West elite. Moreover,
although the party, like the former KNDP, enjoyed less popularity among the autoch-
thonous population in the South West than in the North West, it could nevertheless
count on massive support from northwestern workers and settlers in the region. In
addition, it soon became manifest that the SDF's frequent, and often violent, confronta-
tions with the regime, tuming the Anglophone region into a veritable hotbed of rebel-
lion, had the paradoxical effect of advancing the political careers of northwestern
politicians. The year 1992 witnessed first the appointment of a North Westemer, Simon
Achidi Achu, as Prime Minister in an apparent attempt by the desperate regime to
contain the enormous popularity of the SDF in the North West, and later the spectacular
performance of the charismatic SDF chairman, John Fru Ndi, in the presidential
elections.
Understandably, southwestem memories of northwestern domination in the Feder-
ated State of West Cameroon created resistance among the South-West elite against the
Anglophone movements' advocacy of a return to a two-state (Anglophone/Franco-
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phone) federal arrangement. Furthermore, although South Westerners dominated the
leadership of the most important Anglophone associations, the vast majority of its
members appeared to be SDF members. Little wonder that the South-West elite was
inclined to perceive Anglophone associations as auxiliary organisations of the SDF.
Given their repeated failure to form a party of the same standing as the SDF, the
South-West elite starled to create regional associations to represent and defend South-
West interests. This gave rise to the emergence of the South West Elite Association
(SWELA) and the South West Chiefs' Conference (SWCC) (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands
1998; Eyoh 1998b; Konings &Nyamnjoh 1997; Konings 1999b).
SWELA was an attempt to unite all the existing elite associations in the South West
into one single Organisation. lts leadership continually claimed that SWELA was a non-
political pressure group, the main aim of which was to promote South West Province's
socio-economic development and cultural revival. The South West was to be restored to
its former glory after having been marginalised by the Francophone-dominated state and
subjected to 'Grassfïelds imperialism'. Although the SWELA supported most of the
Anglophone grievances about Francophone domination, it equally claimed that the
South West had been more disadvantaged than the North West in the post-colonial state.
Clearly, fear of renewed North-West domination was one of the underlying motives foi
its foundation. It came into existence after the launching of the SDF and the latter's
subsequent expansion into South West Province. On several occasions, SWELA leaders,
especially those closely allied with the ruling regime, issued public statements blaming
the SDF for acts of violence and anti-govemment activities in the South West.
Strikingly, SWELA membership is restricted to citizens belonging to one of the
region's autochthonous ethnic groups, a distinction which tended to exclude ever
second and third-generation immigrants from membership. This exclusion was based
upon SWELA members' doubts about immigrants' loyalty to their region of settlement
After having been refused membership, Francophone immigrants subsequently formed
an 'Eleventh Province' association. The name Eleventh Province is merely imaginary.
as everybody knows that there are only ten provinces in Cameroon but by adopting the
name Eleventh Province these immigrants expressed their marginalisation and thei:
feelings of being recognised neither as Francophone nor as Anglophone citizens
(Geschiere & Gugler 1998).
Following military brutalities in the South West during the govemment's 1993 anti-
smuggling campaign, a split occurred in SWELA. On the one hand, there were those
who maintained close links with the Biya regime and the ruling party, the Cameroori
Peoples' Democratie Movement (CPDM), and who often displayed strong anti-north-
westem sentiments. This so-called Inkatha SWELA was usually viewed as a CPDM
appendage and a resurrection of VDCUMA, the propagated Victoria-Kumba-Mamfe
alliance in the 1960s to destroy Grassfïelds domination. They opposed the two-state
federal system proposed by the Anglophone movements and championed a ten-state
federal system based on the existing ten provinces in Cameroon, which would retain the
present Separation between South West and North West Provinces, and thus safeguarc
the former's autonomy. On the other hand there were those who were more critical ol
govemment policies and often offered their allegiance to the Opposition parties like the
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South West-based Liberal Democratie Alliance (LDA) and the North West-based SDF.
They advocated closer cooperation between the South-West and North-West elites as a
necessary precondition for an effective representation of Anglophone interests, and
strongly supported the Anglophone movements' demand for a return to a two-state
federal system.
Given the intensification of the power struggles between the South-West and North-
West elites during the political liberalisation process, the Biya govemment found it
increasingly lucrative and politically expedient to tempt the peaceful and conciliatory
South-West elite away from Anglophone solidarity with strategie appointments and the
idea that their real enemy was the unpatriotic, ungrateful and power-mongering North-
West elite. The following example illustrates how successful this divide-and-rule tactic
was. In September 1993, nine southwestem chiefs travelled to Yaoundé to pledge their
unalloyed allegiance to President Biya. They told him that they strongly condemned any
attempt to partition Cameroon on the basis of Anglophone and Francophone cultures
and that they were alarmed at the numerous demonstrations, blackmail, civil disobedi-
ence, rebellious attitudes and recurrent activities to destabilise the state and the govern-
ment, which they particularly attributed to the SDF. They asked the Head of State to
transform the present ten provinces into ten autonomous provinces, and drew his
attention to the fact that, after reunification, South West Province had been discrimi-
nated against in the distribution of strategie posts.4
In response to South-West complaints of North-West domination, Biya began to
appoint some South Westerners to key positions in their own provinces. For example,
Dorothy Njeuma was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the newly created Anglophone
University of Buea and Becky Ndive was transferred from Yaounde to head the
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station in South West Province. Nevertheless,
South Westerners still feit under-represented in the highest govemment offices and
constantly requested that a South Westemer succeed the North Westerner, Simon Achidi
Achu, as Prime Minister. So when, in September 1996, Biya appointed the CDC
General Manager, Peter Mafany Musonge, as Prime Minister and maintained more
South Westerners than North Westerners in key cabinet positions, "the people...went
wild with excitement and jubilation and loudly praised the Head of State" for having at
last listened to the cry of despair of South Westerners, who for over thirty-six years had
been "confined to the periphery of national politics and socio-economic development".
In the words of Musonge himself, this was "the first time in our history as a united
nation that a South Westerner has been appointed prime minister", and South Western-
ers had "to come together to galvanise the second political awakening in South West
Province" and "to strengthen our position and bargaining power".5
Government divide-and-rule tactics culminated in the 1996 constitution. While the
previous (1972) constitution had emphasised national integration and equal rights of all
citizens, including the right "to settle in any place and to move about freely", the new
constitution promised special state protection for autochthonous minorities (Melone et
4
 See The Herald, 3-10 November 1993, pp. 1-3
5
 See 'Significance of P.M. Musonge's Appointment' by a member of the South West, Kome Epule, in
The Star Headlines, 20 November 1966, p. 5
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al. 1996; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000). Significantly, it stretched the conventional
notion of minorities to such ambiguous proportions that historical minorities like the
Anglophones were themselves denied the status of minority, while any ethnic minority
group that appeared to distance itself from the Opposition could rely on govemment
support. Not unexpectedly, the new constitution tended to boost South-West identity
and fuel existing tensions between South Westerners and North Westerners.
The timing of its release was hardly accidental. It was promulgated only a few days
before the 21 January 1996 municipal elections. The South-West pro-CPDM elite was
shocked when the SDF won most key urban constituencies in their region. South West
Province's Governor, Peter Oben Ashu, immediately blamed the settlers, who outnum-
bered the indigenes in most urban areas of the province, for the poor performance of the
CPDM in the urban areas, and on several occasions hè, and other members of the
southwestem elite, ordered them to return home. Before the elections, Nfon Victor
Mukete, the Bafaw Paramount Chief in Kumba, had used Bafaw vigilante groups to
intimidate settlers in the Kumba municipal areas not to vote for the SDF. His action
would be hailed subsequently by N.N. Mbile, one of the oldest political leaders in South
West Province and at that time CDC chairman, at a joint conference of the South-West
chiefs and elites in July 1999, and other traditional leaders were urged to emulate him.6
The South-West elite immediately starled demanding state protection for the autochtho-
nous southwestem minority against the dominant and exploitative Grassfielders. Grass-
fields settlers were likened to scabies, a stubbom skin affliction commonly referred to in
Pidgin English as cam-no-go (meaning an illness that cannot be cured or a visitor who
would not leave). Appeals to the state for protection were often accompanied by threats
of ethnic cleansing and the removal of strangers.
Straight after the elections, the govemment provided the required protection by
appointing indigenous CPDM leaders as urban delegates in the municipalities won by
the SDF. It is beyond any doubt that the Biya regime also rendered assistance after the
municipal elections to the emergence of the so-called Grand Sawa movement,7 an
alignment of the ethnically-related coastal elite in South West Province and neighbour-
ing Francophone Littoral Province on the basis of common feelings of exploitation by
Francophone and Anglophone Grassfïelds settlers (Tatah Mentan 1996; Wang Sonné
1997; Yenshu 1998; Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998). This alignment came into being
after the indigenous Sawa elite in Douala had staged government-condoned demonstra-
tions against the Francophone Grassfielders, the Bamileke, who alone accounted for
70% of the Douala population, and who had provided for only one indigenous mayor
out of the five councils in which they had won the municipal elections on an SDF ticket.
The emergence of the Grand Sawa movement signified an important victory for the
govemment in its divide-and-rule tactics. Evidently, it also had a devastating effect on
6
 See The Herald, 21 July 1999, pp. l and 3-4, for a detailed report on the conference held at the
University of Buea on 17 July 1999.
7
 The term 'Sawa' was generally employed by natives of Douala who refer to themselves as coastal
people. The term was subsequently extended to related coastal people in the Francophone Littoral
Province and Anglophone South West Province. Of late, ethnic groups in Littoral and South West
Provinces, living at a distance from the coast, have also come to identify themselves as such. See Yenshu
1998.
Anglophone identity and Organisation, the Francophone-Anglophone divide becoming
cross-cut by alliances that opposed the coastal people, the Grand Sawa, to the so-called
Grand West, the alliance between the Anglophone and Francophone Grassfielders
constituting the backbone of the major Opposition party, the SDF.
To those who sought protection as minorities, the price to pay would increasingly be
stated in no uncertain terms: Vote CPDM. This is exactly what the new Prime Minister,
Peter Mafany Musonge, and other members of the southwestem elite were telling the
people in the region. For example, on 21 March 1997, the Secretary-General of the
SWCC, Chief Dr Atem Ebako, appealed to South Westerners to support the ruling party
in the forthcoming parliamentary elections:
Our communities, especially those m Fako and Meme Divisions, are swarmed by
Cameroomans from other places and provmces...It is possible to have Cameroomans who
are not indigenous to South West Provmce become representatives of South Western-
ers...m local councüs, parhament and government. This aspect of the evolution of the
political hfe of South West Province, which became very obvious after the 21 January
1996 mumcipal elections, is most repulsive, resentful, indignant, and pre-occupymg.
Our choice is clear as we stated in the General Assembly meeting m Kumba on 8 March
1997. We called on all South Westerners and all their fhends of voting age without
exception to register and vote massively for the candidates of the CPDM party of
President Paul Biya at the forthcoming parliamentary elections 8
The autochthony-allochthony discourse has not only become an important ploy for
political entrepreneurs in their struggles for power. It appears also to have become part
and parcel of the people's daily lives in South West Province.
During elections, the southwestem pro-CPDM elites became accustomed either to
excluding northwestern settlers from voting in South West Province or to bringing
pressure to bear upon them to vote for the CPDM. According to the Cameroon Electoral
Code,9 every citizen may vote in a locality where hè has been resident for at least six
months or where his name is on the income-tax assessment list for a fifth consecutive
year. Despite such rules, northwestern settlers, especially those who were known to be
SDF supporters, were frequently barred from voting in their residential area and
requested to do so in their region of origin (to find out on arrival that they were
supposed to vote in their region of residence). Some southwestem Opposition leaders
appear to have supported this form of exclusion. For example, the Chairman of the
LD A, Njoh Litumbe, stated in 1997 that the Electoral Code should define somebody's
home. Such a defmition would help clarify where somebody was supposed to vote. In
his view, a person's home was where hè would be buried.10 During a meeting of the
South-West elite in Limbe in February 1997 it was decided that strangers had to obtain a
residence certificate as a precondition for being registered to vote, a decision that
settlers immediately condemned as intended to favour the party in power (Yenshu
8
 See 'South West Chiefs' Conference on the Phght of South West Province', m The Pilot Magazine,
May 1997, p 89
 See Republic of Cameroon, Cameroon Electoral Code, 1997 Revised Edition, Yaounde' Les Editions
de l'Imprimene Nationale, 1997
10
 The Herald. 31 March - l April 1997, p. l
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1998). Although this rule was in clear contravention of the Electoral Code, pro-CPDM
officials and chiefs, like Governor Peter Oben Ashu and Chief Mukete of Kumba,
continued to insist on these permits. Since the appointment of the CDC General
Manager, Peter Mafany Musonge, as Prime Minister in 1996, CDC and Pamol workers
(the majority of whom are North Westerners and SDF supporters) have been subjected
to persistent CPDM pressure to support the new prime minister by voting CPDM. CDC
workers were even forced to make compulsory contributions to the CPDM. The CDC
senior staff were equally called upon to ensure that their subordinates voted massively
for the CPDM so as to maintain Musonge in power. Otherwise they would jeopardise
their jobs in the Corporation.11 Traditional secret cults, like Mawu in the Mamfe area
and the Nganya juju in the Bakweri area, were used to intimidate northwestern pro-SDF
settlers during elections.12
The autochthony-allochthony issue is also the subject of continuous discussion in
academie circles and in the press. The Anglophone private press, which initially encour-
aged Anglophone identity and solidarity, has become increasingly split along South
West-North West lines. South-West papers, like The Weekly Post, The Star Headlines
and The Oracle have been created to focus on regional issues of interest to South West
Province and the SWELA, and to oppose the Grassfielders (both the settlers in South
West Province and the autochthons in North West Province). Newer papers, like The
Beacon and Fako International, have been created to altend more specifically to the
political ambitions of the Sawa elite and to oppose Grassfields hegemony as a matter of
policy. During election periods, the southwestem press sought, through the rhetoric of
ethnic cleansing, to solve problems of political representation and to encourage a wide-
spread antagonism of strangers as 'ruthless land grabbers', 'parasites' and 'traitors in the
house'. North Westerners used the private press to fight back. In a similar manner,
existing papers redefined their editorial focus, while new regional papers sprang up. The
sheer volume of diatribes, commentaries, opinions and reports related to the autoch-
thony-allochthony issue in northwestern papers, such as The Post and The Herald, are
an indication of the recent Obsession in the Anglophone area with this issue.
The autochthony-allochthony issue has also affected various institutions in South
West Province. The Buea Anglophone University is headed by Bakweri who has used
all means possible to maintain control over the predominantly northwestern students and
lecturers. There is constant talk of Grassfields domination to the detriment of "sons and
daughters of the soil".13 Neither have the CDC and the Catholic Church escaped from
the autochthony-allochthony phobia. When southwestem papers like The Sketch and The
Weekly Post, both notorious for their anti-North West attitudes, informed the public that
northwestern managers in the CDC had written a memo in which they accused the
General Manager, Peter Mafany Musonge, of favouring his Bakweri kinsmen and
victimising North Westerners, the Bakweri elite organised a march of shame in support
of Musonge. Participants carried spears, machetes, guns and sticks, sang war songs and
11
 Ibid, 19-20 March 1997, p 1.
12
 Ibid, 14-17 March 1996, p. 4.13
 See, for instance, The Post, 18 September 1997, p. 7, referring to the 'Bakweri Mafia', dominating the
University of Buea
190 K.onmgs
displayed placards like "Sack all these North-West managers", "CDC is our own", and
so on.14 The northwestern Catholic bishop of Buea Diocese, Pius Suh Awa, has been
frequently charged in recent years with appointing more northwestern than southwestern
priests in key positions in his diocese. The South-West Catholic population rebelled in
1996 when the bishop took action against a southwestern priest, Father Etienne
Khumba, who had founded a healing church, the so-called Maranatha Movement, which
attracted large numbers of Catholics but deviated, according to the bishop, from
Catholic liturgical rites (Konings forthcoming). Following the priest's repeated refusal
to obey orders, Bishop Awa excommunicated him and suspended his movement. In the
1996-1998 period, the South-West elite brought pressure to bear upon the bishop and
regional authorities to leave Father Etienne and his movement alone and Father
Etienne's followers regularly occupied the bishop's house and disrupted Catholic church
services. After having been frequently warned by the South West Governor mat hè
should obey his bishop's orders and stop his followers' actions, Father Etienne was
eventually evicted from his house by security forces in 1998 and removed to North West
Province where hè was forced to stay in the house of a southwestern bishop.15
The autochthony-allochthony issue has exacerbated conflicts about land in local
communities. It has even had an impact on marriages. Marriages between South
Westemers and North Westemers are increasingly disapproved of, being seen as
political and cultural aberrations.
Conclusion
The massive northwestern labour migration and the subsequent dominant northwestern
Position in the South West form the historica! background for understanding the current
regional Obsession with autochthony and exclusion. Long-standing tensions between the
autochthonous population and the northwestern settlers were exacerbated during
political liberalisation in the 1990s when the regional pro-CPDM elite and the govem-
ment began to Champion various forms of ethnic cleansing. Obviously, such a strategy
served the purpose of achieving or maintaining political power in a period when the
Anglophone region was being transformed into a hotbed of Opposition to the regime and
newly emerging Anglophone organisations were demanding either a return to the federal
state or outright secession.The regional pro-CPDM elite has attempted not only to incite the autochthonous
population against the northwestern settlers but also to amplify the differences between
the two Anglophone provinces. They accuse the settlers of exploitation, land-grabbing
and ingratitude to welcoming indigenes and hold them responsible for all political
disturbances in South West Province, even going as far as insinuating that the poor
performance at elections by the ruling CPDM and federalist/secessionist tendencies
among Anglophones could be attributed wholly to settler Opposition. Considering them-
14
 See The HeraU, 21-24 July 1994, p. 3 and The People's Voice, May 1994, pp. l and 3-8.
15
 See, for instance, The Oracle, February-March 1998, pp. 32-35; and The Herald, 23-25 June 1998, pp.
1-2.
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selves as having suffered greater disadvantage than North Westemers in the distribution
of state power, they see more political capital in promoting southwestern identity and
solidarity than Anglophone identity and solidarity. They are, therefore, inclined to
construe the North-West elite as the greatest menace to the political fortunes of South
West Province through a narrative of the post-colonial trajectory that indicts northwest-
ern politicians as accomplices and beneficiaries of southwestern misfortunes.
The govemment in power has been actively involved in dividing the South-West and
North-West elites, culminating in the promulgation of the 1996 constitution that pro-
mised state protection to autochthonous minorities. The regime has also encouraged the
construction of new ethnic identities, in particular the Grand Sawa movement, an align-
ment of the ethnically-related coastal elite on the basis of common feelings of exploit-
ation and domination by Grassfields settlers. While the autochthony-allochthony issue
has increasingly become commonplace in both the public and private spaces of the
South West, it has never been marked by such extreme forms of violence as in some
other parts of Africa.
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